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IN recent years, perennial questions about criminal responsibility I have
gone through another phase of active and sometimes vociferous debate. After
World War II, both civilian and military leaders of defeated countries were
prosecuted as war criminals under doctrines and conventions of international
law that gave rise to controversies not yet ended.2 As a defeated or liberated
nation put its house in order, many delicate problems involving the activities
of wartime collaborators were resolved in various ways. 3 The boom in world
institution building, which shaped the United Nations and an auxiliary net of
international organizations, made it necessary to consider issues of legal re-
sponsibility.4 Social revolution and national reconstruction have brought about
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1. Inasmuch as this entire article attempts to develop a theory of responsibility, it
would be premature to define that term here. "Responsibility" has been used in several
ways. For example, the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment made the
following observations:
The word "responsible," as Stephen pointed out, is used in one sense by lawyers,
and often in quite another by medical men, and, we may add, by laymen, when
discussing the relation of insanity to crime. For the lawyer "responsible" means
only "liable by the law of England (or Scotland) to be convicted and punished
for a criminal act." Medical men, on the other hand, sometimes use it as though
it referred to some condition of mind, but more often as though it meant "liable
to be punished under the law as it ought to be" if the law took account of modem
medical knowledge. To the layman it means deserving of punishment according
to the standards which ordinary men apply in daily life in deciding whether other
people should be regarded as accountable for their actions.
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 74 (1953).
See also Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISI AND FREED M IN
THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 81 (Hook ed. 1958).
2. The extent of the literature is indicated by NEUMANN, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE
EUROPEAN WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1951). See also APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRUNALS AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (1954) ; GLUEcK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION & PUN-
ISHMENT (1944); KEENAN & BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950);
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958).
3. See Comment, Warthne Collaborators: A Comparative Study of the Effect of Their
Trials on the Treason Law of Great Britain, Switzerland and France, 56 YALE L.J. 1210
(1947).
4. See, e.g., Comment, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142
(1949) ; Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
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the revamping of criminal codes.5 Similar ferment in this country has mani-
fested itself in comprehensive revisions of criminal legislation in Louisiana
and Wisconsin, by movements for reform in other states, and, most signifi-
cantly, by the Model Penal Code project of the American Law Institute.
6
Where reconsideration has been less comprehensive, as in Great Britain, old
controversies-for example, the merits of capital punishment 7 -have never-
theless surfaced. Many countries have been perplexed by the problem of
selecting and enforcing appropriate standards of sexual conduct and juvenile
behavior.8 The extraordinary growth of psychiatry has challenged and con-
fused earlier conceptions of the proper limits of both criminal and civil re-
sponsibility. 9
Although these important developments are known to every informed ob-
server, it is worth emphasizing that the terms and conditions in which respon-
sibility is discussed are rooted in slow historic change. Since the sixteenth
century, at least, the scientific view of the world has been more widely and
fully perceived generation by generation. But how can "scientific determin-
ism," much less the new "indeterminism,""' be harmonized with "responsi-
4 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 445 (1955) ; Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court,
46 Am,. J. INT'L L. 60 (1952) ; Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction (U.N. Doc. No. A AC.
65 L. 13).
5. Donnelly, The New Yugoslav Criminal Code, 61 YALE L.J. 510 (1952); Ancel, The
Collection of European Penal Codes and the Study of Comparative Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV.
329 (1958) ; SELLIx, THE PROTECTIVE CODE, A SWEDISH PROPOSAL (1957).
For recent developments in the Soviet Union, see Karev, The Forthcoming Reform in
U.S.S.R. Criminal Law, with comment by Berman, Harv. L. Record, May 1, 1958, p. 1,
col. 2; Berman, Soviet Law Reform--Dateline Moscow 1957, 66 YALE L.J. 1191 (1957) ;
Lipson, The New Face of "Socialist Legality", Problems of Communism, July-Aug. 1958,
p. 22. For an up-to-date discussion of recent developments in Russia and East Germany, see
Kirchheimer, The Administration of Justice and the Concept of Legality in East Germany,
68 YALE L.J. 705 (1959).
6. Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model Penal
Code, 42 A.B.A.J. 321 (1956) ; Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv.
L. REV. 1097 (1952).
7. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT (1953); KOESTLER, RE-
FLECTIONS ON HANGING (1957) ; Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt
To Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 624 (1957); Williams, The Homicide
Act, 1957, 20 MODERN L. REV. 381 (1957); Allen, Book Review, 10 STAN. L. REV. 595
(1958).
8. See, e.g., Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Report, CUD. No.
247 (1957); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); U.N. SECRETARIAT,
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL POLICY, THE PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUINCY,
Nos. 7-8 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1955. IV. 10).
9. See Dession, Psychiatry and Public Policy, 5 BUFFALO L. REV. 48 (1955);
WEaHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956); Insanity and the Criminal Law-A Critique
of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 317 (1955). See also Lasswell, Legis-
lative Policy, Conformity and Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 13 (Hoch & Zubin
ed. 1955).
10. See Bridgman, Determinism in Mddern Science, and Munitz, The Relativity of
Determinism, in DETERMINISM AND FREDOM IN THE AGE Oi MODERN SCIENCE 43, 63
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bility" ?" Year by year, the disjunction between the thought-ways of science
and of pre-science has become more troublesome.
The recent debate over issues relating to responsibility is having productive
consequences 12 largely because contemporary discussion usually adopts an
analytical framework in which legal activity is viewed as a decision-making
process. Decisions are no monopoly of the courts, however. The term "de-
cision" aptly describes not only the determinations of administrative agencies,
executive organs, and legislatures, but also every act of participation in the
shaping and sharing of power, including many phases of the national and
international decision-making process.' 3
But how does studying the process of decision-making simplify or resolve the
complexities that have barnacled the conception of responsibility? As one
observes how responsibility doctrines are invoked in contexts of controversy
and decision, the more general role of such conceptions is clarified. To analyze
the operation of responsibility in context, one must ask the key questions: Who
talks the language of responsibility? To whom? With what intended effects?
With what realized effects ?
Inasmuch as legal scholars customarily give special attention to the judicial
arena, it is important initially to think about the significance of theories of
responsibility in courts of law. One of the most obvious facts about a criminal
trial is that the whole enterprise is characterized by expectations that responsi-
bility must be discussed-expectations shared by the prosecutor, the defendant
and his counsel, the jurors, the judge, and the public.14 Typically, the prose-
cutor dsserts the responsibility of the defendant while the defendant and his
counsel deny it. The jurors anticipate a judicial instruction regarding the
matter; the public may or may not be in equipoise.
An impartial scientific observer interested in what actually takes place in an
adversary proceeding can immediately arrive at a rather simple hypothesis.
He sees the prosecutor seeking to influence the response of jury and judge in
(Hook ed. 1958). In connection with quantum theory and the resulting need for a more
sophisticated mode of explanation, see BOmR, ATomIc PHYSICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
(1958); HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE
(1958).
11. Katz, Law, Psychiatry and Free Will, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 397 (1955); Hart,
Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN
ScIENcE 81 (Hook ed. 1958).
12. See Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts df Criminal Law,
5 BUFFALO L. REv. 22, 41 (1955) ; WEiHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956).
13. Codemakers-whether calling themselves legislators, commissioners, or reporters
-- cannot avoid committing themselves to canons of responsibility. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). And regulative bodies also must operate within a
set of assumptions about responsibility. See Donnelly, The Law of Evidence: Privacy and
Disclosure, 14 LA. L. REv. 361, 372 (1954).
14. See ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL., THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLiC (1956);
REIWALD, SOCIETY AND ITS CRIMINALS (1950).
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the direction of imposing a negative sanction, whether it be the death penalty,
imprisonment, or a fine. He observes that the prosecutor- anticipates an official
and formal pronouncement of the defendant's responsibility, for example, by
a verdict of guilty, as a prerequisite to the final sanction pronounced by the
judge. By way of contrast, the observer sees counsel for the defendant trying
to elicit a "no sanction" or a "lesser sanction" response. Nonetheless, the de-
fense counsel shares the prosecutor's presupposition that the defendant must
be found responsible before any ultimate sentence may be imposed. An ex-
amination of the behavior of judge and jury confirms the parties' expectations,
for it appears that the decision-makers also look upon a finding phrased in the
language of responsibility as at least logically a preliminary to the imposition
of a deprivational sanction. The observer's "simple hypothesis," then, can
be summarized by saying that when defendant X is declared to be responsible,
a characteristic is imputed to X that makes of him an eligible target for negative
sanctioning measures. This hypothesis applies to certain "civil" proceedings as
well as "criminal" cases, although the terminology may vary among the
categories of controversy.' 5
Yet, despite the critical role played by findings of responsibility, the doctrine
provides little guidance to the decision-maker when he must choose which
negative sanction to impose upon a target individual or group previously
deemed "responsible." Does a finding labelled "criminally responsible" carry
uniform implications concerning the severity of the sanction to be applied? The
label is formalistic and has no consistent contextual meaning. It cannot be
affirmed, for instance, that sanctions directed against "criminal" targets are
uniformly more severe than those imposed upon "civil" defendants.'0 Nor can
it be successfully demonstrated that "criminal" offenders always meet more
intense expressions of community outrage or disrespect than "civil" losers.
Evidently, no more than an erratic relationship exists between the language of
legal responsibility and the facts of the decision-making process.
In estimating the incongruity between declarations of responsibility and
the context of decision, one must gauge the degree to which a court deliberately
"rationalizes" its response. The critical work of American legal realists has
exposed that what a court says about past events or the traits of a defendant
may have little, if any, "truth value" from the standpoint of an independent
and competent observer who investigates the objective facts.17 In part, this
inconsistency is attributable to the court's dependence upon information dis-
15. Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law,
5 BUFFALO L. REv. 22, 26 (1955).
16. Ibid.
17. See generally Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism--Responding to Dcan
Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931); FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 127-28
(1930). See also the selections from Cardozo, Haines, Hutcheson, Llewellyn, Frank and




covered in proceedings that are usually adversary. Chiefly, however, the result
reflects the judges' self-imposed demand to present a self-consistent response.' s
The disjunction between legal theory and the social context is directly ex-
hibited in the "moral" significance presently attached to the category of re-
sponsiblity. Our system of law has tended to employ responsibility in a man-
ner that entirely lacks any standard or intended relationship to ethical norms.
This ethical neutrality is epitomized by the "absolute or strict liability"
offenses "I in which the notion of responsibility, qua sanctionability, is cut
adrift from overtones of moral obligation. Therefore, to infer that X has de-
viated from current ethical standards and sentiments when a court declares X
responsible and inflicts a deprivation upon him is often unwarranted.
However-and this is the point of greatest importance in the present con-
text-the dissociation of responsibility from an evaluation in terms of rectitude
is in no sense complete. "Responsibility" is one of the most heavily charged
terms in our ethical vocabulary. We make everyday appraisals of one another
in statements that include the words "responsible" and "nonresponsible." As
a result, when the word figures among the terms of art in our legal vocabulary,
it is bound to reverberate beyond the simple denotations of professional syntax.
Quite commonly, so far as the conscience of the defendant or the impressions
obtained by a newspaper reader are concerned, the declaration by a court that
an individual or a group is "responsible" is equivalent to saying that the de-
fendant is in some sense blameworthy and culpable. Other related words,
notably "guilt," carry much heavier loadings of this kind, but, if anything,
their emotional charge reinforces that which independently is connected to
"responsibility."
To acquiesce in the present confusion of meaning is unwise. Steps should
be taken, if appropriate ones can be proposed, to isolate the several roles played
by doctrines of responsibility in our jurisprudence. To that end, we shall de-
velop our theory of responsibility, and in so doing, shall consider the elements
of the decisional process, briefly classify potential targets of the condemnation
sanction, characterize offenders functionally, and discuss the policy implications
of our contextual view.
At the outset, it is convenient to distinguish between two categories of de-
cisions that are made by jurors and judges. One category is technical and
the second is effective. The fact-finder is responding technically, for instance,
when it makes a finding that is formally necessary to justify the conviction.
The effectiveness of a response, on the other hand, is the degree of actual
18. Modern dynamic psychiatry has made commonplace the observation that conflicts
between conscious and unconscious knowledge within a personality system may blind the
individual to what the outsider perceives to be flagrant contradictions among his expressed
perspectives. Contradictions that are freer of such conflicts, however, can be self-recognized
and overcome. Social psychologists are actively concerned with these relationships. See
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY,
COI!MUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953) and subsequent studies.
19. See the discussion in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
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indulgence or deprivation that it gives or imposes. The experienced lawyer
presumably regards a finding of responsibility as technical. But the technical
aspect does not necessarily or typically exhaust the total impact of the findings.
The jury may characterize the defendant as "guilty"; the judge may affirm
and embellish the condemnation by denunciations of a moral cast.2 0 Laymen
may interpret the judge's language as an affirmation that a rectitude norm has
been violated and that the defendant is being subjected to additional condem-
nation.
A finding of responsibility, then, comprises both a technical and a "con-
demnation" response, regardless of the words used to communicate the de-
cision. It is a formal expression of censure and disapproval. The condemnation
response is, in fact, a sanction, and a negative sanction at that. Speaking
technically, lawyers are not accustomed to regard it as a sanctioning measure,
but rather as a preliminary to sanction.21 Nonetheless, a contextual approach
in studying the legal process requires us to honor actuality by classifying a
finding of responsibility as a sanctioning instrument. The problems that arise are:
What doctrine of responsibility should be recommended? Assuming that a find-
ing of responsibility is a condemnation sanction, how can this sanction best be
applied?
Presumably, a doctrine of responsibility should yield rational directives for
sanctioning measures. Hence, simultaneous consideration of responsibility and
condemnation sanctions provides an opportunity to explain and utilize a theory
of responsibility by examining its implications for a sample sanctioning instru-
ment. Inasmuch as a finding that a given defendant is responsible operates
both as a condemnation sanction independent of any subsequent sanction and
a prerequisite to such subsequent sanction, we advocate a two-pronged, func-
tional theory of responsibility. As a technical finding, a declaration that a de-
fendant is responsible must be employed with an eye to an ultimate outcome
of the lawsuit that will maximize the social values our legal system is designed
to nourish. As a self-fulfilling community evaluation, responsibility-condem-
nation must similarly be coordinated with the appropriate aims of legal sanc-
tions. These discrete yet ever-related workings of a finding of responsibility
are the keys to our theory of responsibility and to isolating the condemnation
sanction.
WORKING TOWARD A THEORY
This preliminary consideration of the role of a doctrine of responsibility in
the decision-making process has disclosed historical and contemporary uncer-
20. See, e.g., Judge Leibowitz's castigation of Harry Gross, quoted in the dissenting
opinion in People ex rel. Kern v. Silberglitt, 4 N.Y.2d 59, 63-64, 149 N.E.2d 76, 78-79,
172 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148-49 (1958).
21. Of course, the sanction imposed by the court following a finding of responsibility
may itself be condemnatory in character. ROYAL CoMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
REPORT 17-18 (1953) ; Ewing, Punishment as Viewed by the Philosopher, 21 CAN. B. REv.
102 (1943) ; Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YA.E L.J. 987, 1007-26 (1940).
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tainties, inconsistencies, and confusions. Yet judges apparently look to theories
of responsibility for guidance in choosing sanctions for particular targets. By
the same token, the parties assume that some conception of responsibility will
shield them from, or expose them to, the lightning of an adverse outcome. These
expectations are legitimate only in the sense that one test of the rationality of
a doctrine of responsibility is the extent to which it aids in target and sanction
choices.
If any responsibility doctrine is to be of. assistance, it must facilitate the five
intellectual tasks 22 that a¥r always performed, however poorly or brilliantly,
in making a decision. Phrasing the tasks as questions, the fully oriented
decision-maker asks:
1. What value goals (preferred events) are to be maximized?
2. What future events are likely to occur if as little action as possible is
taken in this situation?
3. What future events are likely if alternative policies are adopted?
4. In considering the past as it relates to value goals, what trends are
relevant?
5. What scientific findings are relevant?
Clarification of Goals
Observers of the legal process perceive that systems of legal order can be
operated with emphasis either upon the "ideal" goals of the community or
upon more "workable" norms that prevail in context. Since ideal aspirations
are more often honored in the breach than in the observance, norms that enjoy
a prospect of achieving high levels of effective acceptance may more optimistic-
ally be applied. As a result, decision-makers are well advised to look beyond
the words of a given body of authoritative language in order to discover a
realistic factual basis. And, if the relevant context is to be comprehended by
a decision-maker, appropriate communicative methods must be used; conse-
quently, it is essential for the court to be well informed about the pertinent
body of historical and scientific information.
But the judge is no automatic mechanism of mediation between past prac-
tice and a present, concrete case. What degree of conformity should he try
to maintain between a proclaimed or prescribed norm and the conduct of parties
who come before him as defendants? In a given situation, should he attempt
to increase the degree of future conformity or should he give up this regulatory
attempt as a bad job disproportionately costly in social effort? If varying
22. Lasswell & McDougal, The Jurisprudence of a Free Society: Studies in Law,
Science and Policy (mimeographed materials, Yale Law School 1954) ; Lasswell & Mc-
Dougal, Legal Educatim and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest,
52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); Lasswell, The Political Science of Science, 50 Am. POL. Sci.
REV. 961, 977-78 (1956); McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Pur-
poses: Vahe Clarification as an Instrument of Demcratic World Order, 61 YALE L.J.
915 (1952).
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standards are current in different subcommunities, with which shall the decision-
maker ally himself? For instance, if some areas are inhabited by recent immi-
grants from another culture, or if there are discernible behavioral differences
among upper, middle, and lower classes, or if great yet divergent interest
groups cut across lines of class, or if conduct has been affected by crises of
war preparation, war itself, economic recession, or inflationary boom, which
standards are to be taken as "law" ?23
Queries of this kind indicate that the rational judge cannot properly regard
himself as a blind instrument of something vaguely called the "sense of in-
justice" or "the community norms" or "the laws" (in the dubious sense of the
formal code). The enlightened decision-maker must choose his own overriding
goals (preferred events). In this way, he is able to act deliberately as an ally
of one set or another of past practices, which he then protects or extends while
he operates within the limits of a social role that continues to depend upon
obtaining support from the body politic.
Accordingly, the first step in developing a doctrine of responsibility is to be
as explicit as possible about the values postulated in order to clarify the char-
acter of the preferred events which it is the responsibility of the judge, and
indeed of the legal system in its entirety, to protect and extend. We postulate
"human dignity" as the ideal norm and, in so doing, refer to a society in which
the practices of daily life and the institutions of the social order are brought
progressively into harmony with that norm.
Thus, our overriding goal values are substantially identical with the prin-
ciples articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.24 These ideal
norms are approximately equivalent to the highest aspirations of American,
Western European, and, evidently, many other great traditions. We do not
intend to justify these goals now; rather, we assume them for present purposes
and concern ourselves with questions that arise in seeking to harmonize the
sanctioning activities of a democratic body politic with the ultimate value-
human dignity.
Undoubtedly, reference to human dignity provides a phrase rich in tradition
and one which comprehensively characterizes the long-range objective of any
society that aspires toward freedom. The principles of the Universal Declara-
tion are steps in the direction of specifying the practices-the routines of inter-
action in the social process-which we accept as compatible and consistent
with the fundamental goal. But there is a gap--the distance that often separates
even the relatively specific principles of the Declaration from the prevailing
institutions of a given system of public order. A judge must share in the never-
23. Some of these problems are discussed in Mannheim, Some Aspects of Judicial
Sentencing Policy, 67 YALE L.J. 961 (1958).
24. YEARBOOK OF THE UNiTED NA'roIs 1948-1949, at 535-37 (1950); Bebr, Inter-
national Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, 29 PHIL. L.J. 312 (1954) ; McDougal
& Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community; Constitutional Illusions Versus
Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60 (1949); Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 25 BraT. YB. INT'L L. 354 (1948).
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ending reappraisal of the degree of conformity between the details of life and
the principles which they are supposed to follow, exemplify, and strengthen.
If we were engaged upon an exhaustive application of our conception of
responsibility to the United States (which we are not), it would be necessary
to itemize the components of the national system of public order, and to sub-
mit a provisional characterization of how these components conform to our
postulated value goals and principles. In any event, to indicate concretely what
is meant by the system of public order which it is the function of the legal
system to defend and perfect, we specifically refer to the fundamental features
of the social process viewed as "men pursuing values through institutions
using resources."2 5 To pursue values is to shape and share outcomes like
wealth and well-being. To operate in harmony with the general goal of human
dignity is to favor relatively broad participation in valued outcomes. We
classify institutional practices according to their focus upon each major value.
The basic schemes of value distribution and the most important institutional
patterns comprise the system of public order.
So far as our domestic political institutions are concerned, federalism, the
tripartite separation of authority, the presidency, bicameralism, and adult
suffrage are immediately prominent. As to economic institutions, America is
strongly committed to the ideology of free private enterprise qualified by vary-
ing degrees of dependence upon government in multifarious contexts. In
family affairs our culture approves monogamy, or, more accurately, sequential
monogamy. We protect freedom of worship and expect the churches to gen-
eralize and legitimatize basic conceptions of rectitude. Free universal educa-
tion and freedom of the press are among the doctrines more or less effectively
realized in the sphere of skill and enlightenment. To an increasing extent, we
expect the community as a whole to concern itself with the psychic integrity
of its members. Although the dominant ideology in the realm of respect rela-
tions is anticaste, admittedly the practice in many localities is otherwise.
With these reminders of the system of public order which it is the role of
our legal system to protect and fulfill, we can specify more precisely the function
of courts and sanctions. As previously noted, the courts are chiefly engaged in
the applying function, although they do not have a monopoly of this function,
nor does the work of judicial tribunals exclude all other functions. Many
organs of government besides courts use sanctions. The condemnation sanction,
for instance, may be used by the President when, in his official role, he casti-
25. Lasswell & McDougal, The Jurisprudence of a Free Society: Studies in Law,
Science and Policy 1 (mimeographed materials, Yale Law School 1954). This is the
framework within which the late Professor George Dession of the Yale Law School
developed his reinterpretation of the criminal law field. In preliminary form his views
are reflected by the arrangement of cases and materials in his Criminal Law, Administra-
tion and Public Order (1948), and, in a more developed state, by his article, The Technique
of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law, 5 BUwALo L. REv. 22 (1955). Both
authors of the present article desire to make blanket acknowledgement of their late col-
league's fundamental contribution to the stock of conceptions within which the present
analysis took shape.
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gates those who "peddle influence" and seek to corrupt the Government. To
be sure, these declarations are not sanctions in a technical sense of the word;
but they nevertheless sometimes operate as effective, informal, coercive meas-
ures. They are verbal deprivations imposed in the name of the community by
an official who is castigating target groups and individuals for having violated
community norms. Presumably, the President expects to diminish the chance
that these or other individuals will offend again. In the most inclusive sense,
a community sanction is a practice which is expected to increase the probability
of future conformity to community norms; thus, the meaning comprehends
informal verbal pressures as well as legal deprivations .2
Estimating the Future: Projections and Alternatives
After specifying the kinds of goal values and instrumental institutions that
compose our community ethos and order and form the object of legal sanctions,
we face the next step in outlining our doctrine of responsibility. In addition
to suggesting a set of overarching goals, we must attempt some guidance con-
cerning the ways in which valid inferences about the future can be made--
an attempt involving the second and third intellectual tasks enumerated above.
The future is crucial; all decisions accomplish their results in the future
and not in the past. The decision-maker has a number of alternatives open
to him whose net impact upon preferred values and institutions it is his job
to assess. One ever present alternative is to do the least possible. Considering
the future on the assumption that this alternative is chosen is "projection."
Typically, there are several more alternatives before a judge; for each, the
question is what will be the effect of selecting target A for the application
of sanction 1 or 2 or 3.
A rational guide to final decision must, therefore, classify the possible targets
which the decision-maker should contemplate before coming to a final con-
clusion. All controversies before a court can be classified as "public" or
"private." In a public controversy, a deprivation of public order is alleged;
hence, the representatives of the community appear as parties, as in the tra-
ditional "criminal" action. In a private controversy, a deprivation of private
values is alleged. And since the deprivation is not large enough, or strategically
enough placed, to imperil the system of public order, representatives of the
26. In the present context, we are examining all the activities performed by courts
in the administration of sanctions. Our discussion is more narrowly pointed toward
what are conventionally called criminal cases. The proposed theory of responsibility
defines the field of criminal law more narrowly than it has been defined in the past, yet
our theory has ramifications beyond the criminal law so viewed. The first step has been
to state the goal values (desired outcomes) that we assume to be appropriate for the
judges exerting community authority in a body politic whose general commitment is to
the dignity of man. In the United States, specifically, the preferred institutions that
constitute our system of public order are not difficult to designate. The specific goal
of sanction administration is to protect and fulfill the overriding aim of freedom by
defending and modifying these institutions.
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community do not appear (in their official capacities) as parties. We shall
begin with public controversies and draw up a check list of potential sanction-
able targets ordered as "groups" or "roles." The former term emphasizes
individuals; the latter impersonally characterizes a pattern of activity or posi-
tion in the social process. We begin with groups.
Direct Targets
Judged Offenders. In this category come all litigating parties whom the
court has currently judged to be offenders, or who have a record of having
been so judged by other courts. In the ordinary work of adjudication, spokes-
men of the community see themselves as most immediately confronted by the
problem of how to proceed in dealing with those who have been officially desig-
nated as offenders.
Indirect Targets
Undetected Offenders. That a community's law-enforcement machinery is
bound to fall short of infallible detection of individuals who have deviated from
community norms, and who, if apprehended, would be judged to be offenders,
is widely recognized.2 7 Yet, the sanctions currently applied to known offenders
probably also affect the future conduct of those whose deviations have not been
discovered.
2 8
27. Crimes that are rarely reported are consensual sex acts, petty thefts, frauds,
blackmail, traffic or motor vehicle violations, gambling, prostitution, black-market and
other white-collar violations. Sellin, The Significance of Records of Crime, 67 L.Q. REv.
489, 494-99 (1951); SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMIINOLOGY 25 (5th ed. Cressey
rev. 1955).
Sellin reports that the number of cases of shoplifting known to three Philadelphia
department stores was greater than the total number of thefts of all kinds in the entire
city which were known to the police. SELLIN, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM ON CRIME IN THE
DEPRESSION 69 (1937).
From November 1, 1947, to April 30, 1948, 1,576 persons were apprehended by store
detectives for thievery from four stores in the Loop area of Chicago, but in only 137 cases
was a report made to the police department either as to the offense or the person caught
in the offense. Letter from Virgil W. Peterson, cited in TAFT, CRIMINOLOGY 21 (1950).
In New York State, the only ground for divorce is adultery. Every time a divorce is
granted, therefore, a judge certifies to his belief that adultery was committed by the
defendant husband or wife. But the left hand of the law does not know what the right
hand is doing. In the year 1948, for example, approximately 6,000 divorces were granted
in New York City alone, yet the Annual Report of the Police Department for the same
year does not disclose a single arrest for adultery. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 156
(1951).
And a recent study of the "bad-check problem" in the State of Nebraska concluded
that: "On the average, only about two per cent of the bad checks returned by the bankers
get to the officials; and instead of prosecuting as required by law, the officials are chiefly
engaged in collecting the checks under threat of criminal prosecution." BEuTEL, Ex-
PERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE 406 (1957),
28. This is particularly true of youthful offenders. An important recent book states:
Theft by juveniles, for example, is so common as to be almost universal. The
delinquency laws are so broad that almost every child could conceivably be pro-
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Potential Offenders. For similar reasons, sanctions are often imposed with
persons other than the immediate offender in mind. Society expects that indi-
viduals who as yet have performed no offense may be deterred from doing so
in the future. The expectation relates not only to an offense of the same category
as that sanctioned but also to those of different categories.20 A generalized "law-
abiding" response is believed to be cultivated by at least some sanctioning
measures.
Erroneously Judged Offenders. Another apparently inevitable characteristic of
law enforcement is that innocent parties are sometimes convicted.30 Occasion-
ally, officials discover their errors and admit them.3 1 But a number of unde-
tected or unredressed cases may be extant at any given time. The future conduct
of these unfortunates will be affected by the deprivations inflicted upon them
and, furthermore, they will in all probability respond attentively and sensitively
to news of current sanctioning activities.
Other Members of the Public. This category refers to members of the com-
munity considered as active citizens rather than as individuals who are potential
violators of the law. Judges are not always unaffected by the criticisms that
they expect to receive from professional colleagues, friends, the mass media, and
other elements of the public at large.32 Presumably, too, judges are sometimes
cessed as a delinquent. But for most of these children nothing is done and the de-
linquency matures not into youthful or adult crime but rather into generally law-
abiding behavior. This is true even of the youthful burglars and rapists, many of
whom are never caught and almost all of whom mature into average law-abiding
citizens.
RuDIN, CRuE AND JuvENiLE DELINQuENcY 95 (1958).
29. Andenaes, General Prevention--Iliusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
176 (1952).
30. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); FRANK & FRANK, NOT GUILTY
(1957); KOESmm, RFYLECTIONS ON HANGING (1957); Donnelly, Unconvicting the
Innocent, 6 VAND. L. REv. 20 (1952).
31. In United States v. Kaplan, Judge Weinfeld was persuaded "that the prosecutor's
view that an innocent man has been convicted is correct and that a grave miscarriage
of justice has taken place." 101 F. Supp. 7, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). He reluctantly concluded,
however, that no legal procedure existed for freeing Kaplan and that his only source
of redress was executive clemency. For some inexplicable reason Kaplan's application
for pardon was denied. FRANK & FRANK, NOT GuILTY 111 (1957). See also Donnelly,
Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. Rxv. 20 (1952).
32. In 1939, Thomas J. Pendergast, a party leader in Kansas City, Missouri, and
Robert E. O'Malley, Superintendent of the Insurance Department of Missouri, pleaded
guilty to attempting to evade the payment of income taxes on amounts received by them
in connection with the settlement of litigation on fire insurance premium rebates. In a
long memorandum, District Judge Otis listed the principles governing his sentences
and dealt with certain criticisms as of the sentences as too lenient. He said in part:
This memorandum has been written and filed for the express purpose of sub-
mitting it for publication in the Federal Supplement to the end that there may
be in the literature of the legal profession some record of two cases which attracted
great national interest and which presented problems difficult of solution. What
made the solution of the problems involved the more difficult was the fact that
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influenced by anticipated effects of a decision upon the stability of the com-
munity's political process. 33
In sum, any sanction, whether it be a penal sentence or a public reprimand,
must be gauged as it affects not only the particular defendant in the immediate
lawsuit but also all other target individuals and groups subject to its radiated
even as they were presented one could hear, figuratively speaking, the imprecations
upon defendants of an outraged and injured populace.
Pendergast was sentenced on Monday, May 22, 1939. Five days later, Saturday,
May 27th, O'Malley entered pleas of guilty and was sentenced. In the interim
there was both widespread approval by eminent jurists, lawyers and editors of
the Pendergast sentence and also the most violent criticism. The criticism cer-
tainly was sincere, but hasty, unanalytical, spoken and written apparently in com-
plete blindness to the particular crimes for which sentences bad been imposed
and to the solemn obligations of the judicial oath. . . . The theory of the men
(not one of them ever had been charged with the responsibility of imposing a sentence
in a criminal case) who cried out against the judge with much more vigor than
ever they had cried out against the "Boss" was that Pendergast should have been
punished because he had been "Boss," because he had been suspected of various
offenses against the state and city, because as one put it, "of the backgound."
The judge, it was said, had "let the community down," as if the offense for which
punishment was imposed was an offense against "the community." Pendergast
should have been required to pay not only for the crimes with which he was
charged, but also for all his sins and all the sins of all his followers.
These principles seem to me now as they seemed on Monday to be true and
sound. Perhaps I should have ignored them in the Pendergast case alone. Per-
haps I should have .ignored in that one case precedents and principles and the
commands of reason. Perhaps I should have yielded to passion and hatred and
revenge. I am glad I did not yield.
United States v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601, 602, 607, 609 (W.D. Mo. 1939). Perhaps
the classic statement of the problems of a judge in imposing sentence is ULMAN, TIE
TRIAL JUDGE's DIEMmA: A JUDGE's VIE IN PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 109
(Glueck ed. 1933).
33. Consider, for example, the remarks of Judge Kaufman in the Rosenberg case:
The issue of punishment in this case is presented in a unique framework of history.
It is so difficult to make people realize that this country is engaged in a life and
death struggle with a completely different system. This struggle is not only mani-
fested externally between these two forces but this case indicates quite clearly
that it also involves the employment by the enemy of secret as well as overt out-
spoken forces among our own people. All of our democratic institutions are,
therefore, directly involved in this great conflict ...
I consider your crime worse than murder. Plain deliberate contemplated murder
is dwarfed in magitude by comparison with the crime you have committed. In
commiting the act of murder, the criminal kills only his victim. The immediate
family is brought to grief and when justice is meted out the chapter is closed. But
in your case, I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians
the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the
bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, -with
the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that millions more
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impact. Thus, a finding of responsibility cannot be thought to bear solely upon
a single defendant in most instances. It must be viewed as both an end and a
means (to roughly the same end) for all relevant targets. And, by classifying a
defendant-the direct target of one sanction-the identity of shifting indirect
targets is revealed. Conceivably one individual can play roles and subroles that
fit into all the categories mentioned. An offender may be held responsible for
an act that he did not commit, and thus fall within the first and fourth categories.
But he may have committed other offenses, or the same offense on a different
occasion, and thus also fit into the second category. He may be among the
potential offenders of category three; and he may exercise some influence as
a member of the commenting or voting public. His multiple role invokes a cor-
responding multiplicity of indirect targets as well.
The Use of Trend and Scientific Knowledge
The questions we raise about the future provide a guide for thinking
about future events and for asking selective questions about the past (up to the
"knife edge" present). Conversely, each category of "role" or "group" men-
tioned as important in the future must be identified, to a very considerable
extent, on the basis of information about the past. Suffice it to say for the
moment that in discussing the first two steps-goal clarification and future
projections-we are contributing to the clarification of the two remaining
intellectual tasks performed in every decision, namely, the consideration of
trends and scientific conditions.
of innocent people may pay the price of your treason. Indeed by your betrayal
you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our
country . ..
In the light of the circumstances, I feel that I must pass such sentence upon
the principals in this diabolical conspiracy to destroy a God-fearing nation, which
will demonstrate with finality that this nation's security must remain inviolate;
that traffic in military secrets, whether promoted by slavish devotion to a foreign
ideology or by a desire for monetary gains must cease.
Record, vol. 2, bk. 4, pp. 1613-15, Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
See also United States v. Hurt, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 735, 27 C.M.R. 3 (1958), affirming the
conviction and death sentence of an Army sergeant who was charged with raping and
murdering a five-year-old Okinawan girl. Apparently, feeling was so high against
Americans that the commanding general found it necessary to consult with "the civilian
Chief Executive, the Speaker of the Legislature, the Chief Justice of the Ryukyu Islands,
the President of the University of the*Ryukyus, and the President and Managing Editors
of the civilian .newspapers." Id. at 759:
The judge may believe that mobs are likely to form in protest against certain possible
actions of the court in dealing with a defendant. Mob action may even be expected to
turn into rebellion, secession, or social revolution. We place these contingencies here
rather than in preceding categories, despite the fact that potential offenses are involved,
because of the importance of considering public security in each case. The first four
categories might be reclassified as one type of role-the offender-and the fifth category
as another type of role-the citizen. Such a reclassification would serve to emphasize
that one individual may perform more than one role relevant to the present analysis.
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The utility of reverting to information about the past is even more evident
when we outline the problems that arise in connection with the selection of a
negative sanction. Needless to say, the important consideration in imposing
a negative sanction is whether results will follow that are consonant with the
ends sought or whether the objectives of the legal order can be more con-
sistently or compatibly attained through other means such as a preventive
welfare program or an offer of a reward or incentive to behave. The decision-
maker must ask: "If a negative sanction (such as condemnation) is applied
against a defendant, what probability is there that his conduct will be modified
toward conformity ?" Or, phrasing the same question another way: "Is the
defendant educated or educable ?" This is to ask the final, effective question:
"Is he sanctionable, and how?"
In raising these questions, the decision-maker is inquiring into the present
predispositions of the defendant as they are revealed by information about
his past in order to arrive at an estimate of how he will respond to an environ-
ment that is deliberately made deprivational as a consequence of his conduct.
Obviously, it is within the power of the decision-maker, acting on behalf of
the community, to affect the conduct of the defendant by moulding the environ-
ment; deprivational environments are part of the standard pattern of com-
munity life in the sense that all participants in the community know that
deprivations follow deviations from a norm. This is part of the "standard en-
vironmental exposure" characteristic of the culture.
Lay and scientific observation alike affirm that at any given phase of his
career line an individual may have escaped exposure to standard social environ-
ments. Hence, he may not share those predispositions that enable most men
to benefit from the cues that are provided in the social context. Or, an indi-
vidual may have been exposed to standard environments, yet some factor
largely beyond his control interfered with the advantage he otherwise would
have gained from the experience. Other individuals have acquired the norms
and techniques of the social situation, but are unable to live up to the acquired
patterns due to intervening, specifiable events.
In the light of these distinctions, our conception of a proper doctrine of
responsibility becomes more explicit. If, an individual is educated in the
standard norms and techniques of the body politic, he is educable in the sense
that can be expected to respond in a standard way to the standard practice of
enduring a deprivational environment after breaching a norm. He can be called
"responsible" and thereby made eligible for these exposures, these sanctions.
If on the other hand, the -defendant is not educated' and if he is' not educable
'(unless his deeper predispositions'are transformed), he is not responsible; he
is a correctional 34 rather than a sanctioning problem. He does not learn in
34. The term "correctional" or "corrective" is used by us without "penal" or "crimin-
al" connotations. We are aware that these connotations are often present, yet alternative
categories typically suffer from similar disadvantages. The perspective with which we
view the "corrective" problem is outlined in Dession & Lasswell, Public Order Under
Law: The Role of the Advisor-Draftsman in the Formation of Code dr Constitution,
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standard environments and must either be permanently insulated by withdrawal
from the social context or removed until he has been made educable, educated
or both by reconstruction. The particular corrective measure to be applied
depends upon this judgment.
This conception of responsibility is conducive to classifying offenders accord-
ing to their probable responsiveness or nonresponsiveness to the various dis-
positional measures at the community's command. As our specimen measure.
we shall refer to the condemnation sanction in explicating each category. The
exercise will portray how our doctrine of responsibility provides a guide for
predicting the impact of a condemnation sanction and for considering the
context in which judges must make up their minds.
The categories of offenders are as follows:
The Immature. The immature are not expected to benefit from experience
to the same extent as adult members of the community do. Children and young
people must struggle continually to control impulses they have mastered in-
sufficiently. Although the basic impulses of man continue through life, common
observation reveals that young people are less likely than adults to have per-
fected a workable conscience-largely an automatic agency of internal control.m
Indeed, maturity in our civilization consists of achieving a culturally standard
level of internal responsibility for one's conduct.36 The salient characteristic of a
mature person is that he adapts his conduct to realistic estimates of its conse-
quences. He learns rather quickly from successes and failures; particularly, he is
able to learn by hearing about the experiences of others. The sanctioning pro-
visions of a legal code are for the most part aimed at "standard learners," at
"typically educable" members of the community. If enforcible deprivations are
provided for deviational conduct, the mature members of the community are ex-
pected to take these possible deprivations into account as potential costs in assess-
ing the balance of indulgence and deprivation attendant upon behavioral alterna-
tives. Furthermore, if these calculated risks are taken and an individual "doesn't
65 YALE L.J. 174 (1955). There the major codes of a legal system are classified into
five categories that are called supervisory, regulative, enterprisory, executory, and cor-
rective. The supervisory code relates to the private activities in respect to which the
community decision-maker operates in the role of umpire at the initiative of the parties.
The regulative code includes the standards to be applied, at the initiative of the community,
to the collective stream of private activities (for example, an action to abate a nuisance).
The enterprisory code covers the operations under continuing administration by the govern-
ment, notably organized military and police coerciop, together with whatever operations
come within the scope of civil and nonpolice administration. The executory code (or perhaps
more felicitously, the constitutive code) deals with the organs and competences of those
who participate in the community process of putting prescriptions into effect. We speak
of "sanctioning measures" as part of each of the foregoing four codes. In order to give
prominence to the relatively new conception of the "corrective," the term was used to
designate the fifth subcode. The distinctive task of the corrective code is to specify the
measures appropriate for the nonresponsible-the uneducated or uneducable.
35. ERIKSON, CHmILDooD AND SOCIETY (1950).
36. Erikson, Growth and Crises of the "Healthy Personality," in PERSONALITY IN
NATURE, Soclarv, AND CULTURE 185 (2d ed. Kluckhohn & Murray 1955).
[Vol. 69:869
RESPONSIBILITY
get away with it," the sanction is (or can be) loaded to such a level that the
target will learn to give more weight to the cost side of future deviations.
Significantly, immature individuals are especially likely to be influenced
by condemnation sanctions. In our civilization, at least, the vocabulary parents
and teachers address to children is full of terms affirming or implying standards
and judgments of rectitude: "right," "wrong," "good," "bad," "righteous,"
"sinful." Children also employ the vocabulary of rectitude in coping with adults
and seeking to establish a moral justification for their own demands.
3 7 Still
further, the vocabulary addressed by children to one another is full of this
idiom, as is amply confirmed by studies of the language of children at play."
Another manifestation of the process is the language used by the child when
he is talking (and thinking) to himself.3 9 At certain periods of growth, the
typical preoccupation of young people with moral questions is great and is
reflected in diaries, in attendance at religious exercises, and generally by the
use of moralizing maxims.
40
The Uninformed (Unassimilated). Some individuals simply are unable to
take advantage of the warnings of a legal code because they are psychically or
physically removed from the cultural setting which is taken as a premise by the
code makers. By the uninformed, we mean those who, though they may be
mature and may have enough native talent to learn the patterns of culture, have
had insufficient access to an environment that would instill them with a com-
mand of the basic norms and techniques of a given social setting. One obvious
instance of the unassimilated is the newly arrived and wholly untutored im-
migrant from a sharply contrasting culture. But the class of the uninformed
transcends tbat of the immigrant. Within the confines of any large-scale society
exist subcommunities whose members lack access to the schooling and other
opportunities needed to assimilate the dominant norms and techniques of the
culture: isolated religious communities and remote and parochially-centered
villages in the hill country or in other habitats shut off from communication
37. See the writings of Jean Piaget, particularly his THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF
THE CHILD (Warden transl. 1926); JUDGMENT AND REASONIXG IN THE CHILD (Warden
transl. 1928) ; THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (Tomlinson transl. 1929) ; and
THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHIL, (Gabain transl. 1932).
38. An exhaustive guide to the Language Development in Children, including "good"
and "bad" categories of reference, is by Dorothea McCarthy, in CARMICHAEL, MANUAL
OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 476 (1st ed. 1946).
39. The conscience of the individual depends upon incorporating as demands "of the
Self by the Self" the demands that are nmade upon the primary ego of the child by the
surrounding social environment. The soliloquies of the child that are often overheard
by adults are part of this process. A particularly careful account of the growth of the
self as put forward by George Herbert Mead is NATANSON, THE SOCIAL DYNA1MICS OF
GEORGE H. MEAD (1956). Sigmund Freud's hypotheses about the acquisition of conscience
are abundantly considered in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (annual since 1945).
40. The adolescent phase of development in our civilization is well known for the
"moral" problems that -young people face. In this connection, see SYMONDS, ADOLESCENT
FANTASy; AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PICTURE-STORY METHOD OF PERSONALITY STUDY
(1949).
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with the main centers.41 A condemnation sanction addressed to an uninformed
target often is entirely incomprehensible to him and, in many if not all such
circumstances, evokes a sense of injustice against the seeming arbitrariness
of the measure.4
The Defective and Diseased. No one will deny that educability can be im-
paired by congenital or other organic defects, or by primarily functional
diseases.43 The mere existence of a defect or disease does not, of course, auto-
matically consign the individual to the category of nonresponsibility. A de-
terminative connection must be established between the pathological condition
and ineducability.
Any theory of responsibility is severely tested by the deviational conduct
of an individual who suffers from no discoverable organic pathology, but who
is prevented from making a normal assessment of cost by seemingly unmanage-
able internal factors. In extreme cases, the individual may spend much of his
waking life struggling against a desire to perform an act he abhors and recog-
nizes as having costly consequences, only to be seized by an intense desire to
complete such an act, a desire that overwhelms conscious barriers. Despite
conscious perception of cost (save perhaps during a moment of "seizure"),
the individual is unable to apply his self-appraisal effectively.4 4 In the language
of the redoubtable and preoccupied New England lady who walked into a tree,
she "saw it," but she "did not realize it." Furthermore, the same internal
factors may exert such complete control over his conduct that the individual
is unaware of any deficiency in his judgment despite repeated clashes with the
machinery of public order. From the point of view of personality development,
these individuals remain chronically immature as the result of early regression
and may regress to acutely rebellious, destructively aggressive, wildly suicidal,
or related extremes of conduct.4" The common element in functional disorders
of educability should not be phrased in terms of irresistible impulse, in the
legal sense, but as "compulsiveness" or "compulsivity," so as to emphasize
the graduated nature of these motivational systems. Such "line drawing" calls for
an examination of the whole personality context.
41. See Keedy, A Remarkable Murder Trial: Rex v. Sinnisiak, 100 U. PA. L. RE,.
48 (1951).
42. See YOUNG, AmERICAN MINORITY PEOPLES 246 (1932): "If our desirable penal
objectives may be said to be the protection of society and its members from criminal injury,
and not just revenge, why not extend the principle of individualization to minorities, as is
already being done in a haphazard, occasional manner and has been done more thoroughly
for our Indians and Negroes in slave days ?"
43. Functional diseases are those free of organic lesions sufficient to account for the
pathology. In this connection, we recognize, there are very troublesome questions of drawing
a definitional line.
44. See the interesting case of United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R.
346 (1954), and Dr. Guttmacher's discussion of it in MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. B,
at 175 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
45. See CLEcKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (3d'ed. 1955) ; Guttmacher, Diagnosis and
Etiology of Psychopathic Personalities as Perceived in Our Time, in CURRENT PROBLMIS
IN PSYCmATRIC DIAGNOSIS 139 (Hoch & Zubin ed. 1953).
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Condemnation can have no effect-favorable or unfavorable-in a high though
unknown percentage of cases. Some psychotics, of course, cannot comprehend,
consciously or unconsciously, the informational content of what is said to them.4 6
Some mental defectives can perceive that they are being censored, and weep;
but the justification of the criticism may be wholly lost by virtue of a low in-
telligence function, so that no appropriate memory imprint occurs.47 Certain
neurotic types accept whatever hard judgments are passed upon them and
simply add them to the repetitive themes already employed as part of the
subjective suffering which characterizes their illness but which does not re-
form their conduct.48 Psychopathic characters are unlikely to be moved by
the addition of another denunciation. 49 Many appear driven by unconscious
cravings to be attacked by powerful figures; denunciation by a court is ex-
perienced as a triumph and signifies that another father-substitute has fallen
into the trap and liberated another store of destructive aggression.
The Dissenter. The reference here is to the individual whose violation of
obligation is self-justified by rejecting the ideological system in the name of
which primary and sanctioning norms are defined and applied. This rejection
may, if extreme, manifest itself in service to the ideology of a foreign power
(as in espionage). Such an ideology may affirm a world revolutionary con-
ception against the "counterrevolutionary" ideas that prevail among local
authorities,O Or, the counterideological system may be as yet invoked by
no foreign power; indeed, its supporters may be numbered on the fingers of
one hand. Or, the ideology may champion a religious rather than a secular
system; the religion may or may not be strongly entrenched abroad, and it
may claim millions of adherents or a handful."' The latter cases-taken in
conjunction with isolated political prophets-often merge into one of the pre-
ceding categories (especially that of the diseased) .52
A judged offender may refrain from objecting to an adverse legal action
and content himself with attacking the validity of the whole system of which
the legal arrangements are a detail, or he may focus upon the legal order itself.
In either event, he may be thoroughly immunized against any condemnation
sanctions directed against him. A trained intelligence agent from a foreign
power, a disciplined revolutionary conspirator, a fanatically devout religionist
46. Particularly those suffering from severe organic brain disease. See ENGLISH &
FINCH, INTRODUCrION TO PSYCHIATRY chs. 18-19 (2d ed. 1957).
47. Id. ch. 20.
48. See ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 93 (rev.
ed. 1956).
49. See CrLcKL.EY, THE MASK OF SAxTY (3d ed. 1955).
50. See ELiowr, CRIME IN MODERN SocIETY 179-82 (1952); HoovER, MASTrRS OF
DECErT (1958); WEST, THE MEANING OF TREAsox (1947).
51. See ELLIOTT, CRIME IN MODERN SOCIETY 187-88, 193-94 (1952); 2 EMERsON &
HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1176-96 (2d ed. 1958);
FESTINGER, RIECKEN & SCHAcrER, WHEN PROPHECY FAILS (1956).
52. See LAsswELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS (1930) ; LASSWNELI, PowER AND
PERSONALTY (1948) ; Zink, A Case Study of a Political Boss, 1 PSYCHIATRY 527 (1938).
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-all have become accustomed to assuming that they will be "reviled" among
men, that, indeed, every assault is a sign of the immorality and weakness of
those who are opposed to their ideology.
To be sure, not all dissenters are so exquisitely trained and impervious.
Among defecting agents of foreign powers we have seen the great depth of
ethical conflict to which the personalities of even the most trusted experts are
susceptible. On the issue of responsibility, one question to consider is whether
the condemnation response uttered by a court will capitalize upon existing
internal cleavages, or, on the contrary, reweld the clefts of previously unified
conviction.
58
The Provoked and the Tempted. We speak here of opposites. Both cate-
gories imply relationships to the environment, the former an exposure to de-
privation, the latter to indulgence. Both are estimates of disproportionality,
indicating that imposition or opportunity exceeded the range assumed to be
determinative for classifying ordinary conduct.
This phenomenon highlights a point that applies to the classification of all
conduct, namely, that the classification of any detail of behavior or attitude
depends upon the total situation of which it is part. We often revise "snap
judgments" about human conduct as more information about environmental
and predisposing factors becomes available. The muscle movements that con-
stitute an act are not decisive nor are the content and intensity of conscious
and unconscious impulses, moods, and perceptions; such details must always
be assessed in the light of the significance of the environment for value indul-
gence or deprivation.
If the provocations are extreme, such as an unprovoked attack upon one's
self or a beloved one, the law speaks of justification and excuse.54 Temptations,
too, can be exceptionally inviting, as when a poorly paid cashier who handles
53. The usual effect of legal action against indoctrinated revolutionaries in the United
States is to assist their propaganda technique of exploiting the courtroom situation. In
.919 and 1920 the Communists were under heavy fire from law enforcement officers in
Washington, D.C., and elsewhere over the nation. The first tactic of the Communists
was to refuse to testify. But Benjamin Gitlow, Charles Ruthenberg, and Isaac Ferguson
developed a more durable tactic of condemning the judge and the court. See HowE &
CoszR, THE AmEFICAN COMMUNIST PARTY, A CRIcAL HIsTORY (1919-1957), at 49-60
(1957). See also GATES, THE STORY OF AN AmERiCAN COMMUNIST (1958). And Pro-
fessors Lowenstein and Riesman have ably discussed how the Fascists and Nazis used libel
and libel law as a major political weapon, and that defamation of opponents is one of the
standard devices of political propoganda. See Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political
Extremism in European Democracies (pts. 1-2), 38 CoLum. L. Rav. 591, 725 (1938);
Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 727
(1942); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Cdmment (pts. 1-2),
42 CoLum. L. REv. 1085, 1282 (1942). If libel suits were brought, the courtroom was
used as an arena for further vilification and abuse. For a similar tactic in this country,
see Gordon, Fascist Field Day in Chicago, 166 THE NATION 98 (1948).
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). See also Note, Manslaughter
and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 1021 (1958).
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great sums has an opportunity to make off with millions.55 In everyday speech
and in many legal codes, these circumstances are referred to as extenuating or
mitigating the violation, but there is some reluctance to recognize them as com-
pletely exculpatory, presumably for fear of encouraging deviational conduct.56
If extraordinarily provoked or tempted individuals are made direct
targets of condemnation, many if not most of them will accept the judgment.
Often, they performed the censurable act only after great struggles of conscience,
and the battle may be reawakened by the application of a sanction. They will act
more cautiously in the future. More important, in point of fact, they are not
likely to be faced with such an extraordinary situation again.
The Deceived. Some participants in the sequence of activities that culminate
in redressable injury are not informed of the object of the enterprise.57 Or, the
defendant may be actively misled by the victim.58 If such "innocent" ones are
made targets of condemnation, they are unlikely to feel pangs of conscience.
More probably, some will consider the sanction a provocative act that justifies
them in seeking to take advantage of their outlawed state by becoming pro-
fessional criminals or revolutionaries. 5
55. See CRFssEy, OTHER PEOPiE'S MONEY (1953); PETERsoN, THE EmBEZZLER
(1947).
56. See, e.g., article 62 of the Italian Penal Code, which provides:
The following circumstances, when they are not constitutive elements thereof or
special extenuating circumstances, extenuate the offence:-
(1) Having acted for motives of special moral or social value.
(2) Having reacted when in a state of anger caused by an unjust act of another.
(3) Having acted at the suggestion of a tumultuous crowd ....
(4) Having in crimes against patrimony, or which may in some manner injure
patrimony, caused to the victim of the offence patrimonial injury of ex-
ceedingly trifling extent.
(5) When an act committed with criminal intent by the injured person, in ad-
dition to the act or omission of the guilty party, has co-operated in causing
the event to occur.
(6) Having before the trial fully repaired the injury by means of compensation
and, when possible, restitution.
An elaborate analysis of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances recognized by
American courts appears in Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal (pts. 1-2),
37 CoILUM. L. Riv. 521, 762 (1937). See also the criteria for withholding sentence of im-
prisonment and for placing a defendant on probation in MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1954).
57. This problem arises frequently in conspiracy cases in which the question is whether
or not original agreement contemplated the subsequent "overt acts." See, e.g., Kotteakos
v. United State., 328 U.S. 750 (1946) ; Rex v. Meyrick, 21 Crim. App. R. 94, 45 T.L.R. 421
(Ct. Crim. App. 1929). See also Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68
YMl. L.J. 405, 410 (1959).
58. The classic study is HENTIG, THE CRIMINAL AND HIS VICmTI (1948). The en-
trapnent cases are also relevant. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE LJ. 1091, 1098-15 (1951).
59. judicial measures against defendants who are conscious of their own rectitude
frequently lead to a more generalized rejection of the dominant social system. Eugene
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The Mistaken. A few legal offenders cause harm without desiring to do so.
From their own perspective, at least, they are innocent in so far as they took
"reasonable precautions. ' 60
The Careless. In contrast are those who did not take precautions that
were "reasonable" in the pertinent, cultural situation.6 ' The effect of con-
demnation upon members of this group depends upon their appraisal of them-
selves, an evaluation that does not invariably coincide with the judgment of a
scientific investigator or a decision-maker.
Labelling or, more productively, analyzing the character of the offender
is not enough; when the community as a whole is considered, our conception
of responsibility brings to mind the degree to which the community is involved
in producing the chain of damaging events that are brought to the notice of
the court and also the responsiveness of the body politic to court decisions.
In some cases, it is obvious without further inquiry that failure to reach a
specific decision will arouse public indignation, endanger institutional sta-
bility, and subvert the international integrity of democratic institutions.
02
Nevertheless, an enlightened court may perceive that the community's past
record has contributed mightily to the factors that culminated in the contro-
versy and that the community itself is likely to precipitate violation of its own
norms in the future.63 Looking to the future, however, and weighing the prob-
able response of the public and its leaders, the court may conclude that the
community cannot be educated by a court decision, that the decision will pro-
voke some citizens to commit damaging acts against public officials.0 4 In the
face of such circumstances, a candid judge must admit that the community is
nonresponsible in that it requires a correctional change beyond the potential
of the court, in the particular case, to effect. The court must then bow to the
lack of insight and understanding on the part of the community with the same
logic that it bows to the unwelcome facts of lack of education on the part of
an individual defendant. In some instances, the immediate outcome is the same
for the whole community and the individual defendant who is not responsible.
Both go free. In others, the results diverge. The defendant, though not re-
sponsible, is subject to correction and may be required to undergo hospitaliza-
tion or isolation until he has been reconstructed. The community cannot be
dealt with in this fashion by its judicial instrument.
Victor Debs, for example, was sentenced for contempt of court for violating an injunction
against railway strikers in 1895. In prison, Debs spent much of the time reading and
shortly announced his conversion to socialism. See 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
183 (1943).
60. See Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1 (1957).
61. Codes usually use the terms "recklessness" and "negligence" as categories of
culpability. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
62. See note 33 supra.
63. See the Little Rock integration opinion, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
64. This seems to have been the view of District Judge Lemley in the Little Rock
case. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
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The circumstances confronting a court in most cases, however, are by no
means so extreme. More commonly, an adverse storm of criticism, accom-
panied perhaps by sporadic acts of violence, which can be weathered by the
courts, is to be anticipated."; Recognition of the community's causal contribu-
tion can coexist with a prediction that the community is educable within recog-
nizable limits by such means as a stream of "innovative" decisions. 0
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, our discussion of responsibility has outlined some features of the
decision-making context which a rational judge may consider when confronted
by a controversy occasioning his use of the power of the body politic in directing
a negative sanction against a target. We have proposed two sets of principles
for his guidance. The first set relates to the content of his thinking; the second
to the procedures used in guiding his attention. It is a principle of content
when responsibility is defined as the possession of, or a potential for, at least
a minimal degree of education in the patterns of the social context relevant to
the decision. It is a principle of procedure that spells out the considerations
to be given orderly attention in determining how principles of content are to
be related to specific contexts, in other words, in determining whether a given
target is responsible. An example of a procedural recommendation is the list
of potential targets, since it can be used by the thoughtful judge to guide his
attention to the possible impact of any negative sanction. It can be employed
to emancipate the decision-maker partially from the artful strategies of counsel
in presenting their clients' claims. The list of predispositional groups and
factors is another procedural guide of the same kind. The most generalized
procedural suggestion is the list of the five intellectual tasks to be performed
in solving problems. It serves to remind the decision-maker of the recurring
dimensions of goal, projection, alternative, trend, and condition. The definition
of human dignity as a goal, the specification of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the particularizing of fundamental institutions comprising
the American system of public order are matters of content.
65. See the segregation cases, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
66. The demand to impose suffering may be widespread throughout all or many social
classes in the body politic and it may peculiarly characterize some interest groups and
personalities. During periods of crises, too, sadistic demands may be most active. One
must not lose sight of the fact that an examination of a specific culture will show that
it is characterized by permissive or even adulatory evaluations of cruelty in the name of
punishment. There is no place for cruelty as an end in itself in a value system committed
to human dignity. See Ewing, Punishment as Viewed by the Philosophers, 21 CAN. B.
Rmx. 102 (1943). ROYAL CoasasiSSlON ON CAPITAL PUNISHmENT, REPoRT 17 (1953).
Concessions made to the glorification of cruelty in the name of punishment are justified
only when the net gains outweigh the costs (as to all values involved). Since estimates
of the kind required cannot be made by means of automatic rules, the prospects for human
dignity are best when decision-makers are human beings who gain no gratification by
imposing cruelty.
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Our approach has further implications for a judge. What range of policy
alternatives is open to him? The judge (or jury) can indulge a claim advanced
by a party by accepting it and thus throw the weight of the community's assets
in the balance, or he can deprive a party's claim by rejecting it. If an immediate
target is regarded as "responsible," he is open to negative sanctions whose
range can be described according to severity or mildness and according to the
value involved (for example, rectitude if the defendant is condemned for the
violation of a legal norm that embodies ethical and religious injunctions). If
a defendant is not regarded as a significantly contributing participant in the
controversy before the court, he goes free. If the defendant is judged to be a
significantly contributing and responsible participant, he is subject to sanction.
If the defendant is judged to be a significantly contributing but nonresponsible
participant, our conception of responsibility indicates that he is a correction
problem open to measures whose function is to reconstruct the defendant, or
to withdraw him from the community, or both (medical treatment or re-educa-
tion may or may not require withdrawing the individual from the active life
of society). Withdrawal is indicated if the defendant is regarded as a highly
potential contributing participant in significant deprivations. If the defend-
ant is judged to have learned the proper conduct as a result of his involvement
in the current controversy, he may be allowed to go free.
At this point, we may ask about the other participant, someone who has
suffered a significant value deprivation as an immediate consequence of the
defendant's illegal act. The ordinary course of living subjects everyone to
risks of loss or of blocked gain; risk-taldng is part of the pattern of culture
in any given social context. America's public policy has, by and large, relegated
to the individual the burden of insuring himself against misfortune. More re-
cently, under the changing circumstances of contemporary science and tech-
nology, our institutions of public order have been modified to include compul-
sory insurance arrangements, and the community provides supplementary
income to the dependents of an individual who has failed to make advance
provision for his welfare in the event of adversity. Hence, there are ample
institutional precedents for reparation provisions covering the losses of sig-
nificantly deprived participants. 7
Our conception of responsibility underlines the difficulty of the problem that
confronts a decision-maker in passing back and forth between past and future,
and between estimates of significantly contributing participation and responsi-
bility. The first issue to be determined in a controversy, of course, is whether
a redressable deprivation was imposed upon the alleged victim. After that
come the questions to what extent, if any, the defendant was a participant in
the sequence of deprivation, and whether, if a participant, he is responsible.
Consider a few of the issues that arise in chains of inference pursued by a
rational decision-maker. Suppose a witness describes the precipitating events
of the controversy by this statement: "The defendant struck X with his fist
67. RIESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION (1950).
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and X fell down dead." How can these events be put in context? Is it to be
accepted that the defendant's visible behavior contributed significantly to X's
death? Are we to believe that the blow was part of a sequence of acts con-
sciously designed to damage X? In answering the second question, that is,
to find what is known about the lethality of blows administered to individuals
of specified characteristics, expert scientific testimony is useful. In answering
the third question, information about the trend in the relations between the
defendant and X will be helpful. Had X behaved in a more and more provocative
way toward the defendant? Once certain events have been placed in a context of
past events, the next step is to relate them to the future. Given information
about the predisposition of the defendent to respond vigorously to environ-
mental deprivations of a specified kind, how is he likely to conduct himself
under various future contingencies-prompt release under a suspended sen-
tence; release on probation with solemn warning and admonition; a fine; im-
prisonment for a term of years; release after reconstructive therapy?
Any judgment of responsibility or nonresponsiblity legitimately rests upon
systematic consideration of the whole context in which the precipitating events
that led to an action involving the community decision-makers occurred. Judg-
ments of proportionality-the proportions between past and potential environ-
ments and predispositions; conscious and unconscious factors; capability and
opportunity-are involved.
Ultimately, sanctioning alternatives, such as the condemnation sanction,
enter the assessment of the total picture. The following propositions about the
condemnation sanction are implicit in the foregoing discussion. Thus far, they
have been considered with principal reference to the courts, but they are gener-
alizable for all decision-makers.
1. A decision-maker's condemnation response is supported by self-condem-
nation in the direct target and resisted by countercondemnation.
Verdicts of "guilty" may be echoed by the condemned in the privacy of his
self-estimation; every nuance, ranging from unqualified acceptance to total
rejection, is possible. Countercondemnations are directed against the decision-
maker as an individual or against the system in the name of which the con-
demnation is made. Since the tendency to internalize external evaluations is
especially strong among young people, the immature are likely to overreact
to condemnations, especially in a culture such as ours in which exhortations
to rectitude are deeply embedded in youth-rearing practice. Quite properly,
the immature are exempted from full responsibility, since their initiation into
the norms and techniques of society is incomplete. This technical finding need
not, however, deter an examination of the predispositional status of the young
for the purpose of testing the most effective informal sanctioning measure to
use as part of the basic educational process of the community.
In the extreme, sanctioning measures of a negative kind have little or no
effect upon the subjective outlook of some targets, such as the uninformed.
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2. A condemnation response by a decision-maker is supported by target
condemnation among the members of the body politic, or resisted in varying
degree.
3. A condemnation response by a decision-maker may affect the strength
of factors influencing conscious deterrence, or conscious provocation, to action. 8
4. The condemnation response may or may not be joined with other de-
privations of the target, and with indulgences.
Sometimes the impact of an adverse verdict is found enough; it is ex-
pected that the condemned will acknowledge guilt, ask forgiveness and promise
to do better in the future. A suspended sentence reflects such an expectation.
Quite commonly, on the other hand, the condemnation response is joined with
other deprivations.0 9 Or, as the value categories indicate, sanction targets are
often the inadvertent recipients of important indulgences.
70
5. A condemnation response may be accompanied by various perspectives
on the part of the decision-maker. His private perspective may accept or resist
his external expression. He may estimate the responses of the target and the
community accurately or inaccurately.
IMPOSING THE SANCTION
Of all the events that must enter the decision-maker's consideration, one of the
most manageable features is the technique of imposing a condemnation sanction.
From the standpoints of legislator and judge, the following questions appear:
What are the costs and consequences of attaching a condemnation sanction to a
responsibly performed deviation from a particular prescription? What are
the net advantages of locating the authority to condemn in one rather than an-
other agency or official? What are the ramifications of selecting one occasion
above another, and of arranging the details of the act of condemnation in a
particular pattern?
What deviations?
Assume a businessman who, in determining upon a course of illegal conduct,
calculates his behavior in balance-sheet terms and shows no relevant private
68. Conscious deterrence refers to the situation in which an individual who thinks
of performing an act in violation of a rule refrains from the performance because he
recalls the existence of the rule, the probability of condemnation and other adverse conse-
quences of violation. Conscious provocation, in contrast, refers to consideration of violation
because the actor* objects'to the rule itself or to an application of the rule that he regards as
unjust. 'Consciobs pfov6cafon is c6mnmbfily connected with the affairs of an crganization
that is internally deeply divided:
69. Language of deprivation in terms of rectitude is often mixed with terms of ridicule
and contempt, terms relating to respect. In the past, deprivations of well-being have been
closely associated with condemnation (such as hanging or mutilation) and of wealth
(fines, imprisonment). Other deprivations include loss of civil rights, dissolution of the
family, and denials of access to education or current enlightenment.
70. Such as probation, good time laws, parole, commutation of sentence, and pardon.
See RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1958).
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pathology. The legislator has decided to retain a market regulation even though
not many members of the business community are morally disturbed by a viola-
tion, and only a few articulate economists favor the regulation in the hope of
protecting a free-market structure. Will a condemnation sanction contribute to
the aims of the legislation ; will such a sanction diminish the temptation to deviate
and thus protect the market? Even if severe sanctions are deemed indispensable,
whether the use of condemnation will contribute to adherence remains a key
question. To some extent, the solution may be aided by expert study and
advice.71 The effective severity of a sanction must, as a rule, depend upon the
intensity of the conviction with which the norm is accepted. That intensity, in
turn, can be fostered by condemnatory utterances which set the model for speech,
thought, and deed. In a specific legislative context, relevant guidance may be
obtained from expert interviewing of community leaders and rank-and-file mem-
bers, and from comparative study of enforcement attempts. Today the body
of comparative information is not large. One purpose of this discussion of
responsibility and the isolation of one among many sanctioning measures is to
focus active scientific, scholarly, and administrative energies upon the need for
establishing sound principles for norm and sanction selection.
We emphasize that the official employment of terms which, in ordinary usage,
convey an idea of responsibility (like "responsibility" itself or "criminal") are
condemnations. A principal question for legislators is whether these terms-
especially "criminal"-are employed self-consistently and functionally. We sug-
gest that the prevailing connotations of the terms "crime" and "criminal" stand
in the way of sound strategy on behalf of the American system of public order.
A nonresponsible violation is not a "crime" performed by a "criminal" but an
act performed by some one who is not sufficiently educated, or educable to per-
form a "crime." The nonresponsible participant who has imposed significant
deprivations is not a "criminal" but "a correction problem." If the term "crime"
is retained for its potential weight as a condemnation sanction, it should be
applied only under these conditions: decision-makers believe that the deviation
in question inflicts serious damage upon institutions composing the system
of public order; decision-makers provide for severe deprivations to be imposed
upon those who responsibly perform a deviational act; decision-makers expect
to continue to receive, or presently to succeed in obtaining, agreement and
support from most of the leaders and the rank and file of the body politic.
Who Condemn.s.
The stream of official and unofficial utteranices must be organized by the
decision-makers themselves, who, presumably, can exercise the greatest direct
control in a manner that accomplishes the aim of the sanction in the light of,
and with a view to influencing, unofficial condemnatory activities throughout
the community. More specifically, with regard to informal expressions of con-
71. See ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Coim. ANTITRUST REP.. ch. 8 (1955).
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demnation, the following objectives may be pursued by legislators, judges and
other public officials.
1. To minimize some types of informal expression of condemnation prior
to decision.
Our standards of fair trial do not tolerate courtroom demonstrations of vitu-
perative character against a defendant.72 The rules of evidence are in part de-
signed to provide a measure of protection to the defendant against condemna-
tory characterizations prior to the verdict. 73 We caution counsellors and wit-
nesses; we agree that hostile language and gesture by a judge provide grounds
for a declaration of mistrial.74 We permit trials to be removed from localities
where the perspectives of the community have become prematurely and preju-
dicially crystallized.75 In Great Britain much more vigorous efforts are made
to cut down the volume of predecision comment upon a case.
70
2. To reduce some types of informal condemnation after decision.
Our standards of fairness do not permit us to give public support to the ex-
ercise of informal sanctions against an offender who has "paid his debt to
society."77 In point of fact, the slate is not wiped clean; not all ex-convicts are
restored to their former positions in the community. Furthermore, an ex-
72. Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a
Criminal Case, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 946 (1954); Note, Prosecutor Forensic Misconduct-
"Harmnless Error"?, 6 UTAH L. REv. 108 (1958).
73. One such example is the limitations placed upon the use of character evidence.
MCCORMicx, EVIDENCE § 153 (1954).
74. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 188 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Billeci v. United
States, 184 F2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
75. Note, Local Prejudice in Criminal Cases, 54 HAgv. L. REV. 679 (1941); Annot.,
Hostile Sentiment or Prejudice as Ground for Continuance of Criminal Trial, 39 A.L.R.2d
1314 (1955) ; Note, The Right To An Impartial Federal Jury In The Event Of Prejudicial
Pretrial Publicity, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 651 (1953); Note Controlling Press and Radio
Influence on Trials, 63 Ht-nv. L. REv. 840 (1950).
76. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLANO 119 (1958).
77. RUmN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 140 (1958). And consider the story
of Harry Golden, newspaper publisher and author of a current nonfiction bestseller, Only
in America. It was revealed that in 1929 he had been sentenced to five years in federal
prison for using the mails to defraud. The New York Tine editorialized as follows:
Harry Golden of Charlotte, N.C., was certainly unique among this season's
authors, and perhaps among any season's authors, in not wanting his book to be
a big success. Mr. Golden thought that "Only in America" would sell a few
thousand copies among his friends down South and elsewhere who were familiar
with his hi-monthly publication called "The Carolina Israelite."
He was disappointed. There is something in Harry Golden's writing that turned
his book into a run-away best seller. He had been happily well known in a limited
circle. Now he was famous.
What produced the qualities in Mr. Golden that made him seem a timely ex-
ponent of American ideas, attitudes and emotions? Adlai Stevenson, who with Chief
Justice Warren, ex-Governor Dewey, Carl Sandburg, Fannie Hurst and many
other well-known Americans, knew his work, suggests that he had had an experience
that "deepened his understanding, lengthened his vision, and enlarged his heart." One
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convict often cannot obtain a fresh start even at a much lower rung on the ladder
than that which he forfeited by his offense.78 Officially, the reinstatement of
ex-convicts in the community is encouraged, since failure in bridging the gap
toward a socially acceptable livelihood will increase the chances of further
offenses. Moreover, public-spirited individuals and persons who have had in-
timate reasons for understanding the problem of the social returnee join in-
formally in creating private associations to aid the former offender.
7 9
3. To increase some types of informal condemnation prior to decision.
A prevalent "law-abiding sense" w~hich provisionally condemns conduct
that violates a prescription is an effective instrument of community control. If
individuals who become aware of the apparent offense tolerate it and refuse
to invoke the official machinery of the body politic, the prescription in question
is nominal, not effective, law. The prescription has, in fact, become moribund;
its continued inclusion in the code of the community is an invitation to black-
mail rather than obedience.80 In some instances, however, the salient factors
may be quite different. The lethargic response may derive from a disillusioned
estimate of the integrity of the public prosecutors, courts, and correctional
agencies. Evidence of efficiency and decency will quickly revive an active
invoking function to strengthen the applying function.
4. To increase certain types of informal condemnation after decision.
Often the decision of a court is treated by the public media with complete
indifference or even adverse comment. Consequently, the sanctioning impact
of the official condemnation delivered in the name of the community is dimin-
ished. Official policy, to continue to support the prescription at stake, needs
more outspoken assistance from the informal elements of society. Such an
objective can be sought by many well-established methods, including the law
enforcers' direct appeals for active support.
With the interplay between official and unofficial expressions of condemna-
tion in mind, what officials are likely to prove most effective with what targets?
American judicial practice has not widely experimented in this realm. The
experience was an episode in early life that landed him in a Federal prison for misuse
of the mails.
So now Harry Golden, like another beloved author, who wrote under the name
of 0. Henry, is "exposed." But the real exposure is of an unpremeditated sort: It
is a view of a man's heart, of a lovable philosopher who truly spoke for America,
contributing to our current mood an integration of New York's East Side with a
section of the Old South. He need no longer fear success. If he was rightly penalized
a quarter of a century ago for a youthful error, he is now rightly rewarded and
honored for the highly endowed man he so evidently has become.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1958, § 4, p. 8E, col. 1.
78. RUmN, CRIME AND JUvENiLE DELINQUENCY 140-57 (1958).
79. Ibid. See also AMERICAN PRIsoN Ass'N, A MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STAND-
ARms 379-89 (1954); AMERICAN PRIsoN Ass'N, Services to the Discharged Offender, in
CONTEMPORY CORRECrION 380 (Tappan ed. 1951).
80. The laws dealing with homosexuality provide one example. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND
THE LAw 195, 209-10 (1951).
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jury is limited to a terse "guilty" or "not guilty"; and the trial judge is ex-
pected to utter only whatever statements of the public conscience are appro-
priate in the concrete case. As a rule, appellate judges conduct themselves with
sufficient solemnity to give great weight to their remarks, whether issued for
the court or in dissent. In, contrast, the atmosphere of many lower tribunals
renders them entirely inappropriate to expatiate upon any matter of conscience.
Little ingenuity is required to propose workable ways of modifying the flow of
judicial business so as to permit courts to recapture the atmosphere and the
integrity of judicial tribunals.
When and How?
A great deal of experience in the administration of the condemnation sanction
is available and may be gathered by proper methods of interviewing and of
documentary research. For a random example, national cultures differ in the
allowable degrees of vituperative denunciation they expect and exact from those
who play the role of official spokesmen. Differences corresponding to social
class are observable. Norms vary according to the degree of involvement with,
and exposure to, environments that cut across classes (or fail to include all the
members of a class). Many expect Quakers to be more soft-spoken than
Jehovah's Witnesses; we are not astonished if the graduate of an Ivy League
college has a temperate mode of speech. Crisis situations put men on edge and
push voices up; adjectives are wilder as verbs are more imperative. Personality
factors enter; irascibility is a mark of the inhibited-rage type, for example.
Vituperative denunciation has sometimes backfired; by contrast, however, soft-
spokenness has aroused community fear of somnolence or corruption in the
judicial branch. These responses are often predictable by the use of methods
and principles presently at the disposal of advisors whose talents are available
to the courts.
CONCLUSION
In brief, we regard the decision-maker's designation of a defendant as respon-
sible or nonresponsible to be a determination that rationally presupposes an
orderly intellectual process in which individual and collective factors in the social
context have been considered. Since we postulate human dignity as the over-
riding ideal goal of our society, the choice of targets for applying sanctions
calls for prior judgments of responsibility. Assuming that a situation of damage
has occurred in which the potential object of sanction is involved, the main
question is whether the defendant has sufficiently mastered the appropriate
norms and operating techniques to enable him to participate in the life of the
community in standard fashion. If educated, in this sense, the defendant is
educable by threat or application of the sanctioning system. If, on the contrary,
the defendant is not educated, he should be reconstructed with the aim of being
made amenable to sanctions. When responsible, a defendant is sanctionable;
when nonresponsible, he is a corrective problem. All sanctions, including con-
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demnation, are appropriate when directed at individuals who are educated and
capable of learning-for they are educable.
The conception of responsibility outlined here is explicitly limited to the
problem of identifying responsibility at issue in those controversies in which
the community is both a party and the decision-maker. Presumably, these cases
involve deprivations, actually or potentially inflicted upon the institutions of
public order, of a magnitude that justifies community initiative as well as judg-
ment. By an analysis of nonresponsible participants who have imposed signifi-
cant deprivations, we have attempted to show how our legislators, in particular,
can contribute to the integrity of the legal process by substituting for the un-
fortunate confusion of "criminal" and "civil" a coherent conception in which
distinctions are drawn according to: severity or mildness of deprivation to
public order; severity or mildness of sanction for those who are responsible
factors in deprivations; corrective measures of reconstruction or withdrawal
for those who are nonresponsible participants in significant deprivations. The
idea of responsibility outlined in these pages can readily be extended to contro-
versies in the realm of private arrangements, particularly contract and tort. But
the most pressing need appears to be in connection with the vast domain of
public controversies. In this arena, an adequate jurisprudential doctrine of
responsibility should provide an intellectual tool contributing to the require-
ments of legal scholarship and public policy.
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